Follow
Peter Troyan
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas
D Fragiadakis, A Iwasaki, P Troyan, S Ueda, M Yokoo
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 4 (1), 6, 2016
177*2016
A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
M Pycia, P Troyan
Econometrica 91 (4), 1495-1526, 2023
147*2023
Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
D Fragiadakis, P Troyan
Theoretical Economics 12 (2), 863-908, 2017
127*2017
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
P Troyan
Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2), 936-947, 2012
962012
Obvious manipulations
P Troyan, T Morrill
Journal of Economic Theory 185, 104970, 2020
692020
Obviously Strategy‐Proof Implementation Of Top Trading Cycles
P Troyan
International Economic Review 60 (3), 1249-1261, 2019
64*2019
Essentially stable matchings
P Troyan, D Delacrétaz, A Kloosterman
Games and Economic Behavior 120, 370-390, 2020
63*2020
Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
DE Fragiadakis, P Troyan
Games and Economic Behavior 114, 232-252, 2019
18*2019
School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
A Kloosterman, P Troyan
Theoretical Economics 15 (3), 1095-1133, 2020
142020
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
P Troyan
Journal of Economic Theory 170, 319-345, 2017
12*2017
Matching and market design: An introduction to selected topics
F Kojima, P Troyan
The Japanese Economic Review 62, 82-98, 2011
122011
(Non-) obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms
P Troyan
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 103015, 2024
92024
Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment
A Kloosterman, P Troyan
arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.03644, 2023
32023
A network formation game with private information
A Francetich, P Troyan
Manuscript. Working Paper, 2010
22010
The Random Priority Mechanism is Uniquely Simple, Efficient, and Fair
M Pycia, P Troyan
Working paper, 2023
12023
Implementing diversity in school choice
P Troyan, D Fragiadakis
12013
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms in General Environments
M Pycia, P Troyan
2023
Strategy-proof, Efficient, and Fair Allocation: Beyond Random Priority
M Pycia, P Troyan
2023
Desirable Rankings: A New Method for Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
T Morrill, P Troyan
arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11684, 2022
2022
Desirable Rankings: A New Way of Ranking Outcomes of a Competitive Process
T Morrill, P Troyan
Available at SSRN 4116886, 2022
2022
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20